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Seeking Privileged Information Under Schedule UTP:
Protections and Privileges for Taxpayers
Julia Ushakova*
I. INTRODUCTION
In September 2010, the Internal Revenue Service (the "Service")
released the final draft of a highly controversial form that most publi-
cally traded corporations must submit along with their annual tax re-
turns. The Uncertain Tax Position Statement, Schedule UTP (the
"Schedule"), 1 is a new tool for the Service to obtain taxpayers' possi-
bly privileged information it previously could not access. The Sched-
ule requires certain corporate taxpayers to disclose information
pertaining to their financial reserves for uncertain positions and their
expectations to litigate. The Schedule's requirements have been
scaled back between the draft and the final version, but it is still a
great burden on taxpayers at a benefit of providing the Service with a
road map of issues that merit their attention while theoretically re-
quiring them to do their own legal and factual analysis.
The biggest issue with the Schedule is the Service's ability to use
this new form to begin requesting tax accrual workpapers that are
used to generate the Schedule. In the Service's announcement of the
draft Schedule UTP, it claimed that "'[t]he proposal does not require
the taxpayer to disclose the taxpayer's risk assessment or tax reserve
amounts, even though the Service can compel the production of this
information through a summons."' 2 Thus, the Service effectively put
taxpayers on notice that it may seek to obtain workpapers that are
supplemental to the information disclosed on the actual Schedule.
Subsequently, the Service attempted to persuade taxpayers that com-
plying with the Schedule would not be a detriment to them. It did so
by altering the disclosure requirements set forth in the Schedule and
extending the policy of restraint, which protects privileged documents
that are sometimes disclosed to the taxpayer's auditors from being
* J.D. 2011, University of California, Berkeley School of Law.
1. I.R.S, Dep't of the Treasury, 2010 Schedule UTP, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/
df1120.pdf [hereinafter SCHEDULE UTP].
2. I.R.S. Announcement 2010-9, 2010-1 I.R.B. 408 (Jan. 26, 2010) (quoting United States v.
Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 815 (1984)).
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summoned by the Service during the examination period. However,
as detailed below, the Service has not set up enough protections and
has a variety of ways it can attempt to obtain information that taxpay-
ers have long considered to be privileged. 3
The best way a taxpayer can protect this information is by verifying
that it is privileged, predominantly under the work product privilege,
which could apply not only to tax accrual and audit workpapers sup-
porting the Schedule, but also to the information reported on the
form. More importantly, after recent judicial developments regarding
the Service's attempts to obtain tax accrual workpapers, which will
now include workpapers used to complete the Schedule, taxpayers
have an increasingly solid chance of successfully protecting these doc-
uments. However, the availability of the work product privilege to tax
accrual workpapers still depends on a split in the Circuit courts. This
disagreement arose prior to the release of the Schedule, but the
Schedule exacerbates the issue in part, because it increases the risk of
an aggressive position being detected and challenged, leading to tax
accrual papers being sought more frequently. In addition, the recent
protections spanning to those tax accrual workpapers that are dis-
closed to auditors are available only in certain jurisdictions. There-
fore, taxpayers should be aware of the variety of ways the Service may
attempt to access their private information and the best ways to pro-
tect it.
Until the Supreme Count addresses the issue, the fate of taxpayers
and their tax accrual workpapers is in the hands of the Circuits in
which they litigate. If the Court chooses to address this issue, it could
strengthen the work product privilege and protect taxpayers from
compulsory disclosure of their legal analyses relating to their reserved
and expectation to litigate uncertain tax positions. In the meantime,
the Service should provide taxpayers with more guidance, such as out-
lining the factors to determine an unreserved uncertain tax position
with an expectation to litigate, and provide further guarantees regard-
ing privilege protections past the examination level during litigation.
II. BACKGROUND
On January 26, 2010, the Service released Announcement 2010-9.4
This Announcement stated that the Service intended to institute a
new requirement for certain taxpayers to attach to their annual tax
3. "UTPs are uncertain for a number of reasons, including ambiguity in the law and a lack of
published guidance on issues." IRS Announcement 2010-30, 2010-19 I.R.B. 668 (Apr. 19, 2010).
4. I.R.S. Announcement 2010-9, 2010-7 I.R.B. 408 (Jan. 26, 2010).
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returns a schedule providing information regarding the taxpayers'
"uncertain tax positions."'5 A draft Schedule UTP and instructions
were released on April 19, 2010, with Announcement 2010-306 and,
after reviewing the submitted comments, the Service revised the draft
Schedule UTP. On September 24, 2010, the final Schedule was re-
leased.7 The Schedule was released contemporaneously with An-
nouncement 2010-75,8 describing the changes made to the draft
Schedule, and Announcement 2010-76, 9 detailing the policy of re-
straint that will apply to the Schedule, among other items.
Additionally, along with the Schedule, Treasury Regulation
§§ 1.6012-2(a)(4) and (a)(5) were approved.10 The regulations are de-
signed to officially implement the Schedule and require certain corpo-
rations to file Schedule UTP with returns filed for tax years beginning
after January 1, 2010.11
III. SCHEDULE UTP
A. The Service's Reasons for the Schedule
"Existing corporate tax returns do not currently require that taxpay-
ers separately identify and explain the uncertain tax positions that
are identified in the process of complying with generally accepted
accounting principles. Instead, to identify uncertain tax positions
the IRS must select a return for audit and expend a substantial
amount of effort by revenue agents to determine what uncertain tax
positions might relate to the return.' 12
To solve this burden and, as the Service put it, increase transparency
and information flow, the Service decided to implement Schedule
UTP.13 The Service hopes to benefit from the Schedule by leveraging
the information contained to decrease time spent on research and in-
vestigation, assist with the prioritization of taxpayers for examination,
and identify areas of uncertainty which may require further gui-
dance. 14 However, these benefits come at a great cost to taxpayers,
5. Id.
6. I.R.S. Announcement 2010-30, 2010-19 I.R.B. 668 (Apr. 19, 2010).
7. I.R.S. Announcement 2010-98, 2010 I.R.B. 662, *3-4 (Sept. 24, 2010).
8. I.R.S. Announcement 2010-75, 2010-41 I.R.B. 428 (Sept. 24, 2010).
9. I.R.S. Announcement 2010-76, 2010-41 I.R.B. 432 (Sept. 24, 2010).
10. Treas. Reg. § 1.6012-2(a)(4), (5) (as amended in 2010). The only difference between the
final regulations and the proposed regulations is the effective date: the proposed regulations
required corporations to file Schedule UTP with returns filed for tax years beginning after De-
cember 15, 2009, but the final regulations changed this date to January 1, 2010.
11. Id.
12. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.6012-2, 75 Fed. Reg. 54,802 (Sept. 9, 2010).
13. I.R.S. News Release IR-2010-98 (Sept. 24, 2010).
14. Id.
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not only by harnessing them with the financial burden and the oppor-
tunity cost of time invested to prepare the schedule, but also by in-
fringing upon their legal privileges. "This schedule is perhaps the
fullest expression of mandatory disclosure proposed by the IRS to
date."15
B. Who Must File and When
A corporation must file the Schedule if it files Form 1120, U.S. Cor-
poration Income Tax Return; Form 1120-F, U.S. Income Tax Return
of a Foreign Corporation; Form 1120-L, U.S. Life Insurance Company
Income Tax Return; or Form 1120-PC, U.S. Property and Casualty
Insurance Company Income Tax Return and has assets equal to or
exceeding $10 million. 16 The $10 million requirement is subject to a
five-year phase in for filing the Schedule. Corporations filing with
$100 million or more in assets will file beginning with the 2010 tax
year, those with $50 million in assets will begin to file in 2012, and
those with $10 million in assets will begin to file in 2014.17
The Schedule requires the reporting of tax positions that affect the
United States federal income tax liabilities of corporations that issue
audited financial statements, or are included in the financial state-
ments of a related entity, regardless if the statements are prepared
under U.S. generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), Inter-
national Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), or some other stan-
dard.18 A U.S. federal income tax liability is usually affected when a
tax position that would potentially result in an adjustment to a line
item on the corporation's tax return is not sustained.19 If there is po-
tential that a position may not be sustained, then Financial Account-
15. Edward L. Froelich & James E. Merritt, United States: Schedule UTP: The IRS's Most
Aggressive Tax Position To Date, MORRISON FOERSTER (Oct. 13, 2010), http://www.mondaq.
com/unitedstates/article.asp?articleid=112264.
16. I.R.S. Announcement 2010-75, 2010-41 I.R.B. 428 (Sept. 24, 2010) ("[W]orldwide assets
are used to determine whether a corporation that files a Form 1120-F ... must file Schedule
UTP.").
17. I.R.S. News Release IR-2010-98 (Sept. 24, 2010).
18. I.R.S, 2010 Instructions for Schedule UTP, at 1, available at http://www.irs.govlpub/news-
room/2010_instructions for schutp.pdf [hereinafter "Instructions for Schedule UTP"]. How-
ever, Announcement 2010-75, with which the Schedule was contemporaneously issued, states,
"The instructions clarify that corporations report their own tax positions on Schedule UTP and
do not report the tax positions of a related party." I.R.S. Announcement 2010-75, 2010-41 I.R.B.
428 (Sept. 24, 2010). Therefore, it is unclear what the correct method is. The assumption would
be to follow the instructions for the Schedule and include related parties.
19. Instructions for Schedule UTP, supra note 18, at 1.
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ing Standards Board Interpretation No. 48 ("FIN 48"),20 or another
accounting standard, requires a reserve to be recorded.21 However,
under the above accounting standards, no reserve is required for a tax
position taken on a tax return if the amount is immaterial for audited
financial statement purposes or if the tax position is sufficiently
certain. 22
The specific tax positions subject to disclosure on the Schedule are
those for which a reserve was recorded under FIN 48,23 or another
applicable financial accounting standard, or for which no reserve was
recorded because of an expectation to litigate. 24 The instructions to
the Schedule state that an expectation to litigate exists when: (1) the
corporation or a related party determines the probability of settling
the issue with the Service is less than 50 percent, and (2) no reserve
was recorded under applicable accounting standards in the audited fi-
nancial statements, because the corporation intends to litigate the po-
sition and is more likely than not to prevail on the merits.25 However,
what factors should the corporation assess to determine whether there
is an expectation to litigate with the Service?
A special counsel for the Service stated that the chances of settle-
ment are less than 50 percent if the corporation determines under FIN
48 that a reserve is not necessary "not because of the merits of the
position, but because ... [the taxpayer corporation] determined that
... [it] will litigate and win."'26 This, nevertheless, is quite a cryptic
explanation. Typically, a corporation will look at the merits of its case
when determining whether to litigate and, even then, it is still not
clear which factors it should consider and which it should ignore. The
lack of guidance in this area should be of some concern to taxpayers
since, as further explained below, the Service has an incentive to re-
classify some uncertain positions on the Schedule from an expectation
to litigate to those that are linked to an accounting reserve. This is so
because the reserved positions have to be quantified and ranked by
20. FINANCIAL ACCouNTING STANDARDS BOARD, FASB INTERPRETATION No. 48, Ac-
COUNTING FOR UNCERTAINTY IN INCOME TAXES: AN INTERPRETATION OF FASB STATEMENT
No. 109 (2006), available at http://www.fasb.org/pdf/aop_FIN48.pdf [hereinafter FIN 48].
21. "For example, a decision to amortize an expense rather than currently deduct that ex-
pense, or a decision to currently deduct rather than amortize an expense, affects line items on
each year's return in which the tax position is taken during the period of amortization." Instruc-
tions for Schedule UTP, supra note 18, at 2.
22. Instructions for Schedule UTP, supra note 18, at 1.
23. FIN 48, supra note 20.
24. Instructions for Schedule UTP, supra note 18, at 1.
25. Instructions for Schedule UTP, supra note 18, at 2.
26. Marie Sapirie, UTP Regime Continues to be Refined, Officials Say, 2010 TAX NOTES To-
DAY 238-11 (2010).
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the size of their reserves, while expectation to litigate positions do not
have to be quantified and can be listed anywhere in the uncertain po-
sitions hierarchy on the Schedule.27 The extra information gained
from quantified rankings is beneficial to the Service in analyzing
whether a taxpayer should be audited and in determining what por-
tions of the Schedule to contest. Therefore, the unclear nature of de-
termining whether an uncertain position is in expectation of litigation
may lead to unnecessary controversy and accentuate taxpayers'
problems with the Service.
C. The Schedule's Requirements
On Schedule UTP, the taxpayer will have to disclose up to three
Internal Revenue Code sections potentially implicated by each uncer-
tain position, the taxable year or years to which each position relates,
and whether each position involves a permanent or temporary, or
both, inclusion or exclusion of any item. 28 The taxpayer will also have
to rank the tax positions by size (although disclosure of the estimated
amount is not required), determine if an uncertain position is a major
tax position, and provide a concise description of each uncertain tax
position. 29
Although the dollar amount is not disclosed, the rank of each un-
certain position is based on the size of the corresponding U.S. federal
income tax reserve recorded by a corporation.30 Each reserve amount
must include any related taxes, interest, and penalties accrued. 31
However, as noted previously, uncertain positions relating to an ex-
pectation to litigate do not have a corresponding reserve amount and
are not required to be quantified; therefore, a corporation will have
the ability to include the expectation to litigate positions anywhere in
the hierarchy.32 In addition, corporations will have to place a letter
27. Instructions for Schedule UTP, supra note 18, at 4.
28. Instructions for Schedule UTP, supra note 18, at 4.
29. Instructions for Schedule UTP, supra note 18, at 3-5.
30. Instructions for Schedule UTP, supra note 18, at 3.
31. I.R.S. Announcement 2010-75, 2010-41 I.R.B. 428. However, Heather Maloy, IRS Large
Business and International Division Commissioner, said November ninth in a public talk that it
is unclear what amount the taxpayers should use for ranking uncertain positions, especially
whether companies need to include tax, interest, and penalties accrued for each position when
ranking. Amy S. Elliott, LB-I to Push More Resources to Middle-Market Taxpayers, 2010 TAX
NOTES TODAY 217-5 (Nov. 10, 2010) (quoting Heather Maloy, Comrn'r, Large Bus. & Int'l Div.,
Announcement (Nov. 9, 2010)). If Ms. Maloy is unclear regarding the substance of the reserves
used to rank uncertain provisions on the final Schedule a couple months subsequent to its re-
lease, can taxpayers really be assured that agents out in the field will not request information
relating to the Schedule that the Service vowed to place under the policy of restraint? See infra
Part IV.
32. Instructions for Schedule UTP, supra note 18, at 4.
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"T" in front of the ranking for a transfer pricing position and the letter
"G" for all other positions.33
A taxpayer also must designate some uncertain tax positions as ma-
jor. A position classifies as a major tax position if its corresponding
accounting reserve is greater than or equal to 10 percent of the aggre-
gate amount of the reserves for all of the tax positions that are re-
ported on the Schedule.34 The aggregate amount is calculated without
regard to those positions that are related to an expectation to liti-
gate.35 The request to disclose major tax positions, in essence, re-
quires the corporation to disclose the minimum value of those tax
reserves, even though the Service claimed that it would not require
such information.
A taxpayer could argue that disclosure of a major tax position that
is at least 10 percent of the aggregate reserves is simply a percentage
approach by the Service to obtaining a value for the largest reserves.
To determine the minimum amount of the reserve for a specific uncer-
tain position at issue, the Service simply has to multiply 10 percent by
the aggregate amount of the reserves, which is disclosed in a tax-
payer's financial statements pursuant to FIN 48. The Service, there-
fore, is not abstaining from asking for the reserve amounts, but,
instead, it is abstaining from asking for all of the reserve amounts.
This approach is inconsistent with the policy of restraint, discussed be-
low, under which the Service vowed to refrain from requiring disclo-
sure of information regarding reserve amounts, which come from
accrual and financial audit workpapers. 36 The major tax position re-
quirement, therefore, circumvents the policy of restraint by forcing
taxpayers to include this information on the actual Schedule instead of
the Service having to find a way to request the underlying tax accrual
workpapers and view the reserve calculations for specific positions.
However, taxpayers may be able to counter this requirement and
avoid disclosing their major tax positions by asserting the policy of
restraint.
A taxpayer must also provide a concise description of each uncer-
tain tax position on the Schedule, which should include "the relevant
facts affecting the tax treatment of the position and information that
reasonably can be expected to apprise the Service of the identity of
the tax position and the nature of the issue."'37 The Schedule states,
33. Instructions for Schedule UTP, supra note 18, at 4.
34. Instructions for Schedule UTP, supra note 18, at 4.
35. Instructions for Schedule UTP, supra note 18, at 4.
36. The policy of restraint is discussed further in Part IV.
37. Instructions for Schedule UTP, supra note 18, at 4.
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"A concise description should not include an assessment of the
hazards of a tax position or an analysis of the support for or against
the tax position. '38
This last statement was added to ease taxpayers' fears regarding dis-
closing privileged information on the face of the Schedule. Such fears
arose because a draft version of the Instructions required more infor-
mation to be provided as part of each concise statement and the ex-
amples in that version of the Instructions were not comprehensive. 39
To address this issue, the Service not only changed the Instructions
and included more accurate and complete examples, but also ex-
tended its policy of restraint, which limits the Service's power to re-
quest tax accrual paperwork relating to the information disclosed on
the Schedule.
IV. POLICY OF RESTRAINT
The policy of restraint is an internal IRS policy pledging to neither
request nor summons tax accrual and other financial audit workpapers
relating to a tax reserve for deferred tax liabilities during an examina-
tion of a return.40 Such workpapers generally are prepared by the
corporation and have two major components: [(1)] a brief description
of each potential tax issue and [(2)] the specific financial statement
reserve for each issue. Workpapers also may include tax opinions pre-
pared by outside advisers or by the corporation on its own behalf, and
all workpaper components are generally made available to the corpo-
ration's independent auditors.41  However, tax reconciliation
workpapers, which are typically requested by the Service at the begin-
ning of an examination as a routine matter, are not covered by the
policy of restraint. 42
Eight years after the Service initially declared the policy of restraint
in 2002,43 it issued Announcement 2010-76 contemporaneously with
the final Schedule. 44 The purpose of Announcement 2010-76 was to
38. Instructions for Schedule UTP, supra note 18, at 4.
39. Compare Instructions for Schedule UTP, supra note 18, at 5, with I.R.S., Draft 2010 In-
structions for Schedule UTP 9, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/instructions-for-
schedule-utp.pdf.
40. I.R.S. Requesting Audit, Tax Accrual, or Tax Reconciliation Workpapers, IRM 4.10.20.
41. J. Richard Harvey, Jr., Schedule UTP: Views of a Former Tax Adviser and Administrator,
2010 TAx NOTES TODAY 182-6 (2010).
42. I.R.S. Serv. Pol. for Requesting Workpapers, IRM § 4.10.20.3.
43. The Service declared its existing policy of restraint in 2002 in I.R.S. Announcement 2002-
63, 2002-2 C.B. 72 (July 8, 2002), and later clarified its meaning in the Internal Revenue Manual.
See supra note 36; see also I.R.S. Announcement 2010-9, 2010-1 I.R.B. 408 (Jan. 26, 2010).
44. I.R.S. Announcement 2010-76, 2010-41 I.R.B. 432 (Oct. 12, 2010).
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ease taxpayer concerns regarding the applicability (or lack thereof) of
the policy of restraint to the Schedule, including any supporting audit
and tax accrual workpapers, which are used to prepare the Schedule.
45
Announcement 2010-76 commits the Service to including the Sched-
ule under its policy of restraint.46 Specifically, the Service extends the
policy of restraint to cover documents used to prepare the Schedule
that are otherwise privileged under the attorney-client privilege, the
tax advice privilege in § 752547 of the Code,48 and the work product
doctrine.49 Particularly, the Service's Commissioner stated in a speech
that its extension of the policy of restraint to the Schedule includes
"not seek[ing] documents that would otherwise be privileged, even
though the taxpayer has disclosed the document to a financial auditor
as part of an audit of the taxpayer's financial statements. '50  This
means the Service will not assert during an examination of the tax-
payer51 that the aforementioned privileges have been waived by dis-
closing the documents to an independent auditor during a financial
statement audit.
However, the determination of which documents the Service views
as privileged is one of the most controversial protection issues among
practitioners and taxpayers. 52 What if the Service claims that a work
product, attorney-client, or tax advice privilege does not "otherwise"
exist?53 Typically, most litigation centers on this issue by forcing tax-
payers to protect documents that the Service would not have had ac-
cess to prior to the Schedule.
Even after extending the policy of restraint to cover the Schedule,
the Service was clear that the policy does not apply in two situations,
allowing the Service to waive the policy of restraint and pursue tax
45. I.R.S. Announcement 2010-98, 2010 I.R.B. 662, *9-10 (Sept. 24, 2010).
46. Id. at 1.
47. 26 I.R.C. § 7525 (2006).
48. All references to "the Code" are to the Internal Revenue Code.
49. I.R.S. Announcement 2010-76, 2010-41 I.R.B. 432 (Oct. 12, 2010).
50. I.R.S. News Release IR-2010-98 (Sept. 24, 2010).
51. I.R.S. Announcement 2010-76, 2010-41 I.R.B. 432 (Oct. 12, 2010).
52. "A fundamental question in ascertaining privilege is what constitutes litigation[.]
Case law holds that litigation is adversarial, bearing hallmarks such as the right for parties to
cross-examine witnesses and to dispute evidence. . . . '[P]roceedings before IRS Appeals are
sufficiently adversarial and should trigger protection of work product doctrine."' Jeremiah
Coder, Work Product Protection Stronger After Deloitte, Practitioners Say, 129 TAX NOTES 9
(Oct. 4, 2010). This view is consistent with United States v. Roxworthy, 457 F.3d 590,600-01 (6th
Cir. 2006), in which the court held that an anticipation of litigation exists in an administrative
dispute. Id. However, this paper does not delve into this topic. Nevertheless, taxpayers should
be aware of this possible argument by the Service.
53. As the Service claimed in Deloitte. United States v. Deloitte LLP, 610 F.3d 129 (D.C. Cir.
2010). See infra Section V.A.1.
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accrual workpapers that likely would include information on tax
reserves and tax opinions. The first exception where the policy does
not apply is if the taxpayer engaged in any activity or took any action
that would waive any of the three privileges (e.g., work product, tax
practitioner, or attorney-client privileges). Secondly, the policy does
not apply if the request for the tax accrual workpapers is made under
the portion of the Internal Revenue Manual54 that provides two ex-
ceptions to the Service's policy of restraint: 55 (1) when unusual cir-
cumstances exist, or (2) the taxpayer has claimed the benefits of one
or more listed transactions. 56 A listed transaction is a transaction
"'that is the same as or substantially similar to one of the types of
transactions that the [Service] has determined to be a tax avoidance
transaction.' Only a limited number of transactions are so desig-
nated. '57 In addition, if the Service is pursuing a criminal investiga-
tion against a corporation, then the Service may pursue tax accrual
and audit workpapers, including tax reserves and tax opinions, with-
out being limited by the policy of restraint. 58
Announcement 2010-76 also states that during an examination,
when IRS examiners request tax reconciliation workpapers, which
generally are not protected by the policy of restraint, the taxpayer
may redact certain information "relating to the preparation of the
Schedule." 59 Information that may be redacted includes: working
drafts, revisions, or comments concerning the concise description of
tax positions reported on the Schedule; the amount of any reserve re-
lated to a tax position reported on the Schedule; and computations
determining the ranking of tax positions to be reported on the Sched-
ule or the designation of a tax position as a major tax position.60
The extension of the policy of restraint to the Schedule may have
eased some taxpayers' fears; however, it does not provide full protec-
tion of privileged documents. The Service could claim the policy of
restraint does not apply during the examination period in a variety of
ways. For example, the most malicious maneuver would be if the Ser-
vice reviews a Schedule, determines some positions should be listed
transactions, adds them to the list, and then rightfully waives the pol-
icy of restraint and requests reserve information on those positions.
54. IRM 4.10.20.3.
55. I.R.S. Announcement 2010-76 (Sept. 24, 2010).
56. Id. See also IRM 4.10.20; Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4 (as amended in 2010).
57. United States v. Textron, 577 F.3d 21, 23 (1st Cir. 2009) (en banc), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct.
3320 (2010) (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(b)(2) (2009)).
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Technically, the inclusion of listed transactions would fall squarely
within the exceptions to the applicability of the policy of restraint, but
taxpayers could argue retroactivity (i.e., taxpayers would lack notice
when filling out the Schedule). Furthermore, the Service could judg-
mentally decide that "unusual circumstances" exist and taxpayers will
not have clear authority to challenge that determination and withhold
production.
In addition, the Service may assert that a tax opinion does not fall
within the range of workpapers that are given protection under the
policy of restraint. Tax opinions usually include practitioner analyses
regarding a transaction. The Internal Revenue Manual states tax ac-
crual and audit workpapers are protected by the policy of restraint.61
However, tax opinions are not specifically mentioned, so there is un-
certainty regarding their treatment as either tax accrual and audit
workpapers or tax reconciliation workpapers, which impacts their pro-
tection (or lack thereof). It is possible to presume that Announce-
ment 2010-76's lack of inclusion of tax opinions within the realm of
tax reconciliation workpapers means the Service does not view them
as such.62 Therefore, it follows that tax opinions would fall into the
definition of audit or tax accrual workpapers, which is typically pre-
sumed. However, this is uncertain, leaving open the possibility that
tax opinions could be classified as tax reconciliation workpapers,
which are not covered by the policy of restraint and thus could be
pursued by the Service.
Furthermore, "Announcement 2010-76 provides assurance to tax-
payers that the requirement to file Schedule UTP does not affect the
IRS's policy of restraint during an examination, [but] it does not ex-
tend that assurance to the litigation context. ' 63 Therefore, if the Ser-
vice is restricted by the policy of restraint during an examination
period, it is still able to seek tax accrual workpapers during litigation,
without the taxpayer having any protection from the policy of re-
straint. For example, the Service will be able to assert a subject matter
waiver and/or privilege waiver by disclosure to an auditor, without be-
ing held back, when a controversy proceeds beyond the examination
level.
However, Announcement 2010-76 does not address subject-matter
waivers, meaning that the Service could argue that taxpayers have
61. IRM § 4.10.20.2.
62. See J. Richard Harvey, Jr., Schedule UTP Guidance - Initial Observations, 129 TAX NOTES
115 (2010).
63. Amy S. Elliott, Schedule UTP Might Require Protected Work Product Disclosure, 129 TAX
NOTES 167 (2010).
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waived privilege to all workpapers relating to a certain subject, by dis-
closing information relating to the subject in the Schedule. For exam-
ple, the requirement to disclose major tax positions inherently forces
an entity to provide information about the tax reserves related to each
position, since the classification of a major tax position is based on
relative size. There are two consequences to consider in this scenario:
(1) the Service will be able to obtain information that will allow it to
estimate the value of the reserve, without having to ask for it outright,
thereby circumventing the Schedule's disclosure rules (as previously
discussed), and (2) the Service could claim the taxpayer disclosed
enough information to waive privilege related to that subject allowing
the Service to have access to everything that may relate to the reserve
value of the uncertain tax position. Therefore, in reality the policy of
restraint is a false security blanket for taxpayers that could result in
problems down the road regarding certain Schedule UTP disclosures
and being able to protect their supporting documents. Nevertheless,
the Service has addressed whether completing the Schedule itself con-
stitutes a waiver of the privileges that protect the underlying
workpapers. Apparently, although it is not expressly stated, the Ser-
vice is of the view that it is not requiring the production of any privi-
leged or work product information in the revised schedule, hence
filing the Schedule is not a waiver.64 However, during litigation the
Service may not be so generous as to concede no waiver.65 Therefore,
what should or can taxpayers do to protect themselves? It seems tax-
payers should first attempt to eliminate any uncertain tax positions.
However, this will, most likely, be impossible. Therefore, taxpayers
may try to work toward verifying that information fits within at least
one of the three authorized privileges, so the information is protected
during an examination, even if it is disclosed to an auditor. However,
if privileged information is disclosed to an auditor during litigation,
then the Service may claim waiver, but such claims have received
mixed results.
V. APPLICABILITY OF PRIVILEGES
The Service has the authority to compel taxpayers to provide infor-
mation, but that authority is not unlimited. The Service has broad
64. Taxpayers should also consider the consequence of waiver with respect to other federal
and state agencies, such as state tax authorities, which are not bound by Announcement 2010-76.
65. "If taxpayers do end up making UTP disclosures, a possible defense to the question of
subject matter waiver could be found in new Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 502(a) ... though
... the rule is untested." Jeremiah Coder, UTP Regime Aims to Be Consistent With Financial
Reporting Standards, IRS Official Says, 2010 TAX NoTEs TODAY 211-1 (2010).
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power under § 6011 to require every person obliged to submit a tax
return, to include in the return all information required by the rele-
vant forms or regulations prescribed by the Secretary.66 Under
§ 7602, the Service also has broad authority to summon any records or
testimony necessary to ascertain the correctness of a tax return.67
However, the Service's disclosure and summoning power is limited by
the work product privilege, the attorney-client privilege, and the tax
practitioner privilege under § 7525 of the Code.68
A. The Work Product Privilege
The work product privilege, which derived from Hickman v. Tay-
lor,69 is partially codified 70 in Rule 26(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.71 The privilege is described as extending to docu-
ments and other tangible things that "are prepared in anticipation of
litigation or for trial."' 72 The privilege protects from "disclosure of the
mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of a
party's attorney or other representative. ' 73 The Supreme Court ex-
plained that when determining work product privilege, instead of
looking to a document's subject matter, "the literal language of [Rule
26(b)(3)] protects materials prepared for any litigation or trial as long
as they were prepared by or for a party to the subsequent litigation. '74
For example, documents prepared by accountants at the direction or
under the supervision of an attorney in anticipation of litigation qual-
ify for the work product privilege, regardless of their content.75 How-
ever, an accountant's workpapers prepared solely for a corporate
66. 26 U.S.C. § 6011 (2010).
67. 26 U.S.C. § 7602 (West, Westlaw through P.L. 111-383).
68. 26 U.S.C. § 7525 (2006).
69. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
70. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3) "partially codifies" the work product privilege
announced in Hickman, which is broader than the rule itself. United States v. Deloitte LLP, 610
F.3d 129, 136 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
71. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
72. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)(A).
73. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)(B).
74. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 500 (quoting Federal Trade Commission v. Grolier Inc., 462 U.S. 19,
25 (1983)). Presumably, the D.C. Circuit in United States v. Deloitte LLP does not dispute this
statement when it determines that the court must look at whether work product is included in a
document, regardless of who prepared it. 610 F.3d 129, 136 (D.C. Cir. 2010). This is because the
court should not look to the subject matter, but instead to the actual content of the document.
In Deloitte, an attorney made statements in anticipation of litigation and another party happened
to memorialize it. Consistent with Hickman's rule, the information was protected because the
statements were prepared for litigation by the attorney for the litigating party.
75. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 (1975); United States v. Bell, 1994 WL 665295 (N.D.
Cal. Nov. 9, 1994).
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audit, are not protected from compelled production by the Service. 76
Nevertheless, determining the meaning of "prepared in anticipation of
litigation" has been a challenge; the circuits are currently split on this
issue.
The majority of circuit courts have adopted the "because of" stan-
dard to interpret the phrase "prepared in anticipation of litigation. 77
The "because of" standard means the work product privilege applies if
a document was prepared because of the prospect of litigation. How-
ever, two circuit courts representing the minority do not follow the
majority's "because of" test for work product protection 78 due to a
disagreement between circuits regarding the treatment of tax accrual
workpapers; specifically, disagreeing whether these workpapers are
"prepared in anticipation of litigation. '79
The term 'tax accrual workpapers' refers to those audit workpapers,
whether prepared by the taxpayer, the taxpayer's accountant, or the
independent auditor, that relate to the tax reserve for current, de-
ferred and potential or contingent tax liabilities, however classified
or reported on audited financial statements, and to footnotes dis-
closing those tax reserves on audited financial statements.80
The minority circuits generally hold the work product privilege to
be inapplicable to tax accrual workpapers similar to those used to pre-
pare the Schedule; however, the eight other majority circuits apply a
rule under which the assertion of the work product privilege would
most likely be upheld.8 ' "One circuit, the D.C. Circuit, has explicitly
held that the work product privilege applies to tax accrual workpapers
relating to uncertain tax positions." 82
1. The Majority
United States v. Deloitte LLP,8 3 from the D.C. Circuit, is the most
recent appellate case applying the work product doctrine to tax ac-
crual workpapers. In Deloitte, the government subpoenaed three doc-
76. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805 (1984). Nevertheless, they are subject
to the policy of restraint. However, as discussed later, these documents are protected in some
circuits, only if they are produced for a "dual purpose:" for a corporate audit and in anticipation
of litigation.
77. Walter A. Pickhardt, Minnesota State Bar Association Tax Section Comments on Proposed
Regs to Implement UTP Reporting, 2010 TAX NoTEs TODAY 187-24 (2010).
78. Id.
79. Id. The Supreme Court has not addressed this issue, while circuit courts disagree on the
legal analysis.
80. IRM § 4.10.20.2.
81. Pickhardt, supra note 77.
82. Pickhardt, supra note 77.
83. 610 F.3d 129 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
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uments from the taxpayer's independent auditor, Deloitte, but
Deloitte declined to provide the documents, claiming the work prod-
uct privilege.84  Therefore, the government sued to compel
production. 85
One of the documents at issue was a draft memorandum prepared
by Deloitte, which summarized a meeting between the taxpayer's em-
ployees, its outside counsel, and Deloitte employees about the possi-
bility of future tax litigation and accounting for the litigation in the
ongoing audit.8 6 The government claimed that the document was not
work product because it was prepared by Deloitte, not the taxpayer or
its representative, and it was made during the routine audit process,
not in anticipation of litigation.87 Additionally, the government ar-
gued that even if the work product privilege applied, the taxpayer
waived it "when it orally disclosed the information recorded therein to
Deloitte." 88
The court found that the oral thoughts and opinions of counsel
made during the meeting were intangible, yet still protected under the
work product doctrine if made in anticipation of litigation.89 How-
ever, Rule 26(b)(3) only addresses documents and tangible things. 9°
Therefore, the Court held that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
only partially codify the work product doctrine developed in Hick-
man.91 Hickman extends the doctrine to "the thoughts and opinions
of counsel developed in anticipation of litigation," which, the court
determined, continue to be privileged even when incorporated into a
memorandum prepared by the independent auditor.92 Through the
court's holding, the D.C. Circuit developed a rule: a court must look
at whether the document contains work product, even if it is a record-
ing of a work product protected intangible statement, and not at who
created the document or how that party is related to the taxpayer.
93
84. Id. at 133.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 135.
88. Deloitte, 610 F.3d at 134.
89. Id. at 136. The U.S. district court for the northern district of Illinois followed this reason-
ing in DSM Desotech Inc. v. 3D Systems Corp., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3292, 5-6 (N.D. Ill. Jan.
12, 2011).
90. Id. (quoting Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947)).
91. Id. at 136.
92. Id.
93. Deloitte, 610 F.3d at 136. See also Regions Fin. Corp. v. United States, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 41940 (N.D. Ala. May 8, 2008) (indicating that work product privilege applies to tax
accrual workpapers consisting of "core" tax memoranda, as well as "derivative documents" cre-
ated by the taxpayer or its auditing firm that discussed, quoted, or explained the "core"
memoranda).
460 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL
The court also had to determine whether the memorialized
thoughts and opinions of counsel could be used in other ways beside
in "anticipation of litigation" and whether such use would waive the
work product privilege. The D.C. Circuit, like most circuits, applied
the "because of" test.94 The court held that under the "because of"
test, "material generated in anticipation of litigation may also be used
for ordinary business purposes without losing its protected status"95 -
also called "dual purpose" use of the documents. Therefore, a memo-
randum created during an audit to use in the audit may still be pro-
tected if the memorandum was created "because of" anticipated
litigation.
The "dual purpose" portion of Deloitte's holding was largely based
on precedent from circuits that make up the majority; specifically,
from a Sixth Circuit case, United States v. Roxworthy.96 Here, the
Sixth Circuit determined that the work product doctrine applied to
the tax accrual workpapers at issue. The court accepted the "dual pur-
pose" requirement for tax accrual workpapers by finding that even
though the workpapers were prepared in part to assist the corporation
"in avoiding underpayment penalties during an audit, the documents
[did] not lose their work product privilege 'merely because [they
were] created in order to assist with a business decision,' unless the
documents 'would have been created in essentially similar form irre-
spective of the litigation."' 97 Therefore, "[e]xcept where a document
would have been generated in the normal course of business even if
no litigation was anticipated, the work product doctrine can reach
documents prepared 'because of litigation' even if they were prepared
in connection with a business transaction or also served a business
purpose., 98
Deloitte also addressed two other documents. The first document
was prepared by the taxpayer's accountant and its in-house attorney,
and the second by the taxpayer's outside counsel. 99 Both documents
were provided to Deloitte so that it could review the adequacy of the
taxpayer's tax reserves for the ongoing audit. 1°° The government con-
94. Deloitte, 610 F.3d at 137.
95. Id. at 138.
96. 457 F.3d 590 (6th Cir. 2006).
97. Id. at 598-99 (quoting United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194, 1202 (2d Cir. 1998)).
98. Id. (quoting United States v. Chevron-Texaco Corp., 241 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1082 (N.D. Cal.
2002) (emphasis added)). The Second Circuit reached a similar conclusion in United States v.
Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194 (2d Cir. 1998) (indicating that tax-related opinion work product is privi-
leged if created in anticipation of litigation, even though it was also used for a non-litigation
business purpose).
99. Deloitte, 610 F.3d at 133.
100. Id.
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ceded that the documents were work product, but claimed that the
work product privilege was waived through disclosure to Deloitte.10 1
This was an issue of first impression for U.S. Circuit Courts. 10 2 The
question the court had to consider was whether Deloitte could be the
taxpayer's adversary in the sort of litigation addressed in the docu-
ments disclosed. 103 Using this standard, the D.C. Circuit rejected the
Service's argument, finding that the taxpayer's auditing firm was not
"the sort of litigation adversary contemplated by the waiver stan-
dard."'1 4 Furthermore, Deloitte was not a conduit to the taxpayer's
adversaries. 10 5 The taxpayer had a reasonable expectation of confi-
dentiality because Deloitte, as an independent auditor, had an obliga-
tion to refrain from disclosing confidential client information under its
professional ethics rules.10 6
In late 2010, the Sixth Circuit relied on the Deloitte's reasoning that
disclosing documents to auditors does not waive any applicable privi-
leges. 10 7 This means that at least two circuits now agree that disclo-
sure to an auditor does not constitute privilege waiver, which is a very
strong argument in favor of the taxpayers in a Schedule UTP related
dispute. This will be a helpful argument so long as the court is able to
first recognize that the underlying documents are, in fact, privileged.
This is where courts in most cases halt their evaluation, which pre-
vents them from being able to subsequently reach the question of
waiver.
2. The Minority
The Fifth and the First Circuits neither agree with the "because of"
standard nor the above outcomes in work product privilege cases re-
lating to tax accrual workpapers. United States v. Textron Inc.10 8 is
both the most popular and the most recent case to come out of the
101. Id.
102. Id. at 139. Deloitte was followed in a recent district court case that stated, "voluntary
disclosure to a third party constitutes a waiver where the disclosure is made under circumstances
inconsistent with the maintenance of secrecy from one's adversary." In re Veiga, No. 10-370
(CKK) (DAR), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116999, at *19 (D.D.C. Nov. 3, 2010).
103. Deloitte, 610 F.3d at 140.
104. Id. This standard was examined at great length and followed in Harris v. Koenig, No. 02-
618 (GK/JMF), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96956, at *40-41 (D.D.C. Sept. 16, 2010).
105. Deloitte, 610 F.3d at 140.
106. Id. at 142.
107. New Phoenix Sunrise Corp. v. Comm'r, No. 09-2354, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 23909, 27
(6th Cir. Nov. 18, 2010).
108. 577 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2009) (en banc), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3320 (2010).
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First Circuit Court of Appeals on this topic.109 In Textron, the tax-
payer's accountants and in-house tax attorneys had prepared calcula-
tions of tax reserves for its audited corporate financial statements, 110
which included the "estimated probability of a successful challenge by
the IRS.""' Textron claimed, and the district court held, that "there
would be no need to create a reserve in the first place if Textron had
not anticipated a dispute with the IRS that was likely to result in liti-
gation or some other adversarial proceeding. '" 12
Nevertheless, the First Circuit, sitting en banc, held that the tax ac-
crual workpapers were independently required by and created "be-
cause of" statutory and audit requirements." 3  Therefore, the
workpapers were not entitled to work product protection, even
though litigation was always a possibility." 4 The First Circuit had
found that the documents would serve no purpose in litigation. The
court went so far as to say that "[n]o one with experience of lawsuits
would talk about tax accrual work papers" as if they have the "touch
and feel of materials prepared for a current or possible .. . law
suit." 1 5 The court went on to explain that work product protection
for tax accrual workpapers was unavailable, because its First Circuit
precedent in Maine v. United States Department of the Interior16 de-
termined documents prepared in the ordinary course of business or
those that would have been prepared irrespective of litigation are not
awarded protection. 1 7 However, how the court concluded that tax
accrual workpapers must always be prepared for other reasons than
"because of" anticipation of litigation is a mystery. At times, certain
documents (e.g., opinions of a tax attorney) prepared in anticipation
of litigation may be needed to comply with audit requirements,
thereby putting them or their information into the tax accrual
workpapers category. Why should such documents lose their
protection?
109. Textron has been criticized by the D.C. and Third Circuits and is only followed by its own
First Circuit. United States v. Deloitte LLP, 610 F.3d 129; Smith v. Life Investors Ins. Co. of
Am., No. 2:07-cv-681, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96310 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 16, 2009); United States v.
Ramos-Gonzalez, No. 07-0318 (PG), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113971 (D.P.R. Oct. 25, 2010); Mul-
lins v. Dep't of Labor, No. 08-1422 (JA), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101168 (D.P.R. Sept. 27, 2010);
Gerber v. Down E. Cmty. Hosp., 266 F.R.D. 29, (D. Me. 2010).
110. Textron, 577 F.3d at 22.
111. Id. at 25.
112. Id. at 26.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 25.
115. Textron, 577 F.3d at 30.
116. Maine v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 298 F.3d 60 (1st Cir. 2002).
117. Textron, 577 F.3d at 30.
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In addition, even though the court declared that it used the "be-
cause of" standard, many, including the dissenting opinion, argue that
the court used the "prepared for" use in litigation standard; the reason
this case is not considered part of the majority.118 This is contended
because the court stated, "many of the debatable cases affording work
product protection involve documents unquestionably prepared for
potential use in litigation if and when it should arise. There is no evi-
dence in this case that the workpapers were prepared for such a use or
would in fact serve any useful purpose for Textron in conducting liti-
gation if it arose." 11 9
The Fifth Circuit is the additional circuit to not apply the "because
of" test. Rather, this circuit uses the "primary motivating purpose"
test, a stricter standard. In United States v. El Paso Co.,120 the Fifth
Circuit determined the "primary motivating purpose" behind a tax
pool analysis creation, a type of tax accrual workpaper, was financial
reporting purposes alone.121 This was because the sole official func-
tion of the tax accrual workpapers at issue was to support the financial
statements in order to comply with SEC regulations. 22 Therefore, the
court did not provide the workpapers with the work product privilege.
B. Applying the Work Product Privilege
1. Schedule UTP Disclosure
In a lawsuit between a taxpayer and the Service regarding disclo-
sure of information on the Schedule, the Service is most likely to pre-
vail. This is due to the combination of the Service's power to compel
information disclosure under § 6011 and the court viewing both the
decrease of information required for disclosure on the final Schedule
compared to the draft and the extended policy of restraint as
favorable concessions. Nevertheless, some strong arguments centered
on the work product doctrine can be made to prevent disclosure of
some Schedule UTP requirements.
The concise description, along with the classification of major tax
positions and determination of uncertain tax positions relating to an
expectation to litigate, are the main disclosure concerns for the Sched-
118. See Textron, 577 F.3d at 32; United States v. Deloitte LLP, 610 F.3d at 138; Kenneth B.
Clark, Ruminations on the Government's Position in Textron, 2010 TAX NoTEs TODAY 104-7
(2010).
119. 577 F.3d at 30 (quoting Maine v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 298 F.3d 60, 68 (1st Cir. 2002)
(emphasis added)).
120. 682 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 944 (1984).
121. Id. at 542.
122. Id. at 543.
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ule. Specifically, a recent KPMG Tax Governance Institute (TGI)
survey found that 44 percent of 1,100 business leaders stated their big-
gest concern was providing the concise description for a disclosed un-
certain tax position. 123 However, under § 6011, the Service most
likely has the power to ask for such information, but it should be
aware that taxpayers could attempt to assert the work product privi-
lege and forego disclosing any privileged portion of these three
requirements.
Further, under § 7602 summons powers, the Service is restrained by
privileges and limitations such as the work product privilege.124
Therefore, a parallel argument can be made that the Service's power
under § 6011 is also limited. The Supreme Court has decided an anal-
ogous case in taxpayers' favor and, based on that outcome, it is likely
that a taxpayer would prevail in a § 6011 issue. In the analogous case,
the Supreme Court ruled that a taxpayer may not refuse to file an
income tax return based on the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination. 125 However, a taxpayer may claim the privilege
with respect to specific questions asked on a return. 2 6 Therefore,
even though this would be an issue of first impression, taxpayers can
argue the applicability of the work product privilege to the informa-
tion disclosed on a tax return, but will not be able to assert a privilege
to avoid filing the Schedule. 127
Taxpayers can also argue that they need not disclose the relevant
information and nature of the issue, which comprise the concise
description, for uncertain tax positions that are due to an expectation
to litigate. This may be claimed because taxpayers determine this in-
formation in anticipation of litigation and, therefore, depending on
the circuit, the information may be protected by the work product
privilege. Taxpayers cannot claim this protection for purely factual
material, even if the factual material is contained in work product
privileged documents, but may claim it for communications. 28 For
example, a taxpayer will have to disclose on the Schedule any relevant
information and nature of the issue relating to an uncertain position
for an expectation to litigate, so long as the information is only fac-
123. Christina Broder, KPMG: Executives Anxious About Reporting for Uncertain Tax Posi-
tions Schedule, Blo4.coM (Oct. 25, 2010), http://www.big4.com/news/kpmg-executives-anxious-
about-reporting-for-uncertain-tax-positions-schedule-1862.
124. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 398-99 (1981).
125. See United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259 (1927); Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648
(1976).
126. See Sullivan, 274 U.S. at 259; Garner, 424 U.S. at 648.
127. Pickhardt, supra note 77.
128. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 395-96.
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tual. Any information that can be labeled as privileged, which goes
beyond facts (e.g., advice and opinions), a taxpayer should be able to
forgo disclosing. However, it is possible that the Service may argue
that the decision to forgo establishing a reserve and claiming an uncer-
tain position with an expectation to litigate was made primarily for the
Schedule, or for the taxpayer's financial statements; that possible fu-
ture litigation is a secondary purpose when evaluating whether to es-
tablish a reserve, which is similar to its argument in the El Paso
Company. Depending on the circuit, especially given that many cir-
cuits have not addressed this issue, the taxpayer may prevail.
In order for a taxpayer to succeed in arguing that uncertain tax po-
sitions related to an expectation to litigate are protected, the taxpayer
will have to convince the court to follow Deloitte and Roxworthy if the
case arises in another jurisdiction. For example, "the Tax Court fol-
lows the U.S. Court of Appeal for the District of Colombia Circuit for
rules of evidence[,] but ... there is a question whether work product
privilege is a rule of evidence. ' 129 The issue has been argued in the
Tax Court before, but "the court sidestepped it in the related unpub-
lished opinion."'1 30 Therefore, the taxpayer will have to rely on argu-
ing that the rationale developed in the above cases is correct. The
taxpayer can accomplish this by proving that the expectation to liti-
gate positions were developed "because of" anticipation to litigate,
along with financial statement and Schedule UTP requirements. This
would have to be done under the "dual purpose" approach. However,
the taxpayer will have to show that these documents would not have
been created in essentially the same form if litigation were not
expected.
2. Schedule UTP Non-Disclosure
In some cases where a transaction is not disclosed on the Schedule,
a taxpayer may have no option but to provide the Service with privi-
leged information. Consider the following:
"Assume that the IRS challenges a taxpayer position, contends that
Schedule UTP was not complete, and proposes whatever penalties
pertain to such nondisclosure. In this situation, the only way that a
taxpayer can support its tax return and avoid the anticipated conse-
quences of non-disclosure on Schedule UTP is to share its legal
analysis. If the whole point of the analysis is that no reserve was
necessary was because litigation was not reasonably anticipated,
how can the otherwise-privileged analysis have been prepared in an-
ticipation of litigation? The taxpayer is thus in a classic Catch 22,
129. Elliott, supra note 63.
130. Elliott, supra note 63.
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since the only way the analysis is privileged is if the legal work was
prepared in anticipation of litigation. However, if privilege exists
because litigation was anticipated, the issue should have been part
of Schedule UTP. Either way, the taxpayer loses." 131
The only protection in this case awarded to the taxpayer is the policy
of restraint. However, this policy is extended only during an examina-
tion and is not applicable during litigation. Again, the introduction of
the Schedule increases the burden put on taxpayers by the Service and
widens the array of ways that the Service is able to obtain privileged
information from taxpayers.
C. Tax Accrual Workpaper Disclosure
A corporation's financial statements show only the aggregate uncer-
tain tax position liability recorded, and do not show the value of a
reserve for each individual tax position. However, the underlying
records supporting the financial statements contain this detail. These
tax accrual work papers normally contain a description of the relevant
facts, the expected IRS contrary position and rationale, legal analysis,
assessment of the risks, and the likely settlement amount. 132 If ob-
tained by the Service, these tax accrual workpapers provide the Ser-
vice with both identification of specific issues and negotiating leverage
from knowing the taxpayer's evaluation.
The Schedule does not require the taxpayer to disclose its risk as-
sessment or tax reserve amounts, but the Service stated in Announce-
ment 2010-9 that they can compel the production of this information
using their broad power to summon under § 7602. This statement is
justified to the extent that the Supreme Court confirmed the Service's
right to obtain tax accrual workpapers from a taxpayer's financial
statement auditor under its summons authority.133 However, because
the Court declined to judicially create an auditor privilege, its decision
in no way impinged upon the privilege protections available to the
taxpayer.
The Service's conclusion regarding their summons power was due
to their eight-year old determination that tax accrual workpapers "are
not generated in connection with seeking legal or tax advice, but are
developed to evaluate a taxpayer's deferred or contingent tax liabili-
ties in connection with a taxpayer's disclosure to third parties of the
taxpayer's financial condition," making tax accrual workpapers "not
131. David Nolte, IRS Scales Back Its Draconian Schedule UTP Draft, and Requires the Final-
ized Schedule in 2010 (Oct. 7, 2010), available at http://www.hg.org/article.asp?id=20037.
132. Id.
133. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805 (1984).
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privileged communications. ' 134 However, many courts disagree with
the Service's overstatement of the law. 135
What would happen if the Service claimed that a privilege did not
otherwise exist or that it was waived by disclosure to the taxpayer's
auditor? 136 Depending on the circuit that addresses this issue, the tax-
payer will be able to protect its reasons, rationales, etc. for uncertain
tax positions by arguing that, contrary to the Service's opinion, the
work product privilege protects tax accrual workpapers that are pre-
pared in anticipation of litigation and were used to prepare the Sched-
ule. Taxpayers will have to be extremely cautious when attempting to
prove the work product privilege for tax accrual workpapers. The cor-
poration will have to verify the content of the documents is work
product regardless of who drafted them and that any information be-
yond the facts was determined "in anticipation of litigation." These
requirements must be met even if the documents are being used for
multiple purposes (e.g., aside from "in anticipation of litigation").
Also, as stated above, it is critical to show that the documents were
not created in essentially the same form as they would have been if
litigation did not exist. Therefore, even if it were disclosed to an audi-
tor, most circuits would uphold the protection.
If work product privilege is proven, the taxpayer could argue that
the Tax Court must follow the D.C. Circuit's rules of evidence, if the
privilege could be classified as such, and also that the majority of the
courts, especially district courts in a number of states, have accepted
dual purpose use for tax accrual workpapers and disclosure to audi-
tors as non-waiver. However, the argument will almost certainly be
unsuccessful in the First Circuit, applying Textron, since that circuit
does not classify tax accrual workpapers as privileged. Alternatively,
success in the Supreme Court is promising due to greater support
across the country for dual-purpose tax accrual workpapers and
courts' consideration of disclosure to auditors as constituting non-
waiver.
If the case reaches the Supreme Court, the Court should, at least,
acknowledge the Service for its recent concessions. The Service has
made many changes from the draft Schedule to the final Schedule.
134. I.R.S. Announcement 2002-63 (July 8, 2002).
135. Id.; see also Neil Traubenberg, TEl Comments on Proposed Schedule, Draft Instructions
for Disclosure of Uncertain Tax Positions, 2010 TAx NOTES TODAY 104-67 (2010). See, e.g.,
United States v. Rockwell Int'l, 897 F.2d 1255 (3d Cir. 1990) (enforcing a summons for a tax-
payer's free reserve file, subject to the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine).
Id.
136. As the Service claimed in Deloitte. United States v. Deloitte LLP, 610 F.3d 129 (D.C.
Cir. 2010).
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Most of these changes were to ease taxpayers' concerns regarding
privilege and waiver issues and the burden of complying with the new
requirements. Given the Supreme Court's decision in United States v.
Arthur Young & Co.,137 the Court will most likely weigh certain fac-
tors, including the conflicting public policy goals and the evidence of
what the Service has accomplished to lessen the burden. 138 The Ser-
vice's compromises will be a factor that the Court will look upon fa-
vorably and may even cause it to find for the Service. However,
taxpayers could counter by claiming that the public policy goals of
obtaining privileged documents that were disclosed to auditors do not
outweigh the effect of diminished disclosure between taxpayers and
their auditors that such a policy would cause. This consequence would
then have a domino effect, leading to less transparency regarding tax
reserves and less accuracy for audited financial statements.
Again, the taxpayer will have to be wary of waiver. As discussed
above, a taxpayer should be careful and only disclose privileged work
to non-adversaries. Excessive disclosure on the Schedule may waive
certain privileges related to the underlying forms, because the Sched-
ule is submitted to the Service, an adversary. The amount of content
from tax accrual workpapers that may be disclosed on the Schedule
before waiver varies by circuit.139 Additionally, the policy of restraint
binds the Service not to assert waiver of privileged documents when
disclosed to an auditor; but again, this would only apply during an IRS
examination, not during litigation.
Alternatively, the taxpayer could argue that the workpapers created
for Schedule UTP are not considered tax accrual workpapers. This
can be accomplished by looking to the Service's definition in Internal
Revenue Manual 4.10.20.2, which states that tax accrual workpapers
"relate to the tax reserve" and "to footnotes disclosing those tax
reserves on audited financial statements." The taxpayer could show
that certain positions, such as those in anticipation of litigation, are
not reserved and the workpapers relating to those positions, therefore,
do not relate to a tax reserve. This argument would remove these
workpapers from the definition of tax accrual workpapers and could
make the work product privilege argument more successful in some
circuits. On the other hand, this argument could remove the policy of
restraint as a protection. However, realistically, if the Service was ad-
amant in obtaining the workpapers, it would simply do so at the litiga-
137. 465 U.S. 805 (1984).
138. Id.
139. Compare United States v. Davis, 636 F.2d 1028, 1043 n.18 (5th Cir. 1981), with United
States v. Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d 1223, 1227 n.12 (6th Cir. 1979).
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tion stage without being drastically held back by the policy of
restraint. But, if the taxpayer takes away the Service's argument in
Textron by reclassifying the workpapers as something other than tax
accrual, then the Service cannot claim that the workpapers are inher-
ently not produced because of or prepared for potential use in antici-
pation of litigation. This could be a great advantage, especially in the
First Circuit, because the court would get to consider an alternate ar-




It is possible that the attorney-client privilege may apply to certain
information required to be disclosed in the Schedule since some infor-
mation requested is inherently based on advice of counsel. The attor-
ney-client privilege may be invoked when communication between a
client and an attorney is "made in confidence for the purpose of ob-
taining legal advice from the lawyer. ' 140 Disclosure of a confidential
communication waives the privilege.
The District Court in Textron, undisputed by the First Circuit, de-
termined that the attorney-client privilege was waived.141 It ruled that
insofar as "the Textron-prepared work papers might otherwise be pro-
tected by attorney-client privilege . . . [the] privilege[ ] had been
waived when Textron disclosed the work papers' content to Ernst &
Young, [Textron's independent auditor]." 142 Therefore, if a concise
description for an uncertain tax position includes any information that
was obtained from a communication between an attorney and the cor-
poration as the client, or the communication is shared with auditors or
other individuals, the attorney-client privilege may be waived and dis-
closure of the information or related tax accrual workpapers may be-
come necessary.
If waiver is avoided, then a taxpayer could argue that requiring it to
explain the nature of the issue for the concise description, for exam-
ple, improperly delves into mental impressions, conclusions, opinions
or legal theories that were provided by an attorney to his client, which
are currently protected by the attorney-client privilege. This is be-
cause, to determine the riskiness of litigation, among other things, the
corporation may approach an attorney with whom all communications
140. United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 922 (2d Cir. 1961) (emphasis in original).
141. United States v. Textron Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d 138, 150-55 (D.R.I. 2007).
142. Id. at 152.
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that are not privy to others are privileged and cannot be disclosed.
However, this argument, compared to the work product privilege, is
less likely to prevail.
2. Tax Practitioner Privilege
The tax practitioner-client privilege is codified in § 7525 of the
Code 143 and may be a last resort for a taxpayer attempting to protect
documents used to prepare the Schedule from the Service. This privi-
lege protects communications in the form of tax advice between a tax-
payer and a "federally authorized" 144 tax practitioner, to the extent
that a privilege protects communications between a taxpayer and an
attorney.145 The tax practitioner-client privilege applies only to com-
munications, not work product, and does not span to include prepara-
tion of a tax return, accounting advice, or simple discussions of federal
tax issues generally necessary to file a tax return.146 The privilege may
be asserted only in connection with a noncriminal tax matter before
the Service or a noncriminal tax proceeding brought in federal court
by or against the United States. 147 Again, this would constitute much
more limited protection than the work product doctrine. However, it
is possible to claim some communications, such as whether something
should be included on the Schedule, is protected.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Service's approach to the Schedule and the underlying tax ac-
crual and audit workpapers will continue to change with new guidance
and judicial developments. However, currently, taxpayers who are re-
sponsible for filing the 2010 Schedule should be extremely cautious
regarding the amount of information they disclose on the actual
Schedule and the documents they disclose to third parties, including
auditors. Solidifying that documents containing highly sensitive infor-
mation are in fact privileged should be of the highest priority to
Schedule UTP filing taxpayers. Following Deloitte, these taxpayers
have newfound ground to protect privileged documents, even if the
battle in the Supreme Court is imminent.
143. 26 U.S.C. § 7525 (2006).
144. A federally authorized practitioner means any individual who is authorized to practice
under federal law before the Service pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 330. See 26 U.S.C. § 7525(a)(3)(A)
(2006).
145. 26 U.S.C. § 7525(a)(1) (2006).
146. United States v. Frederick, 182 F.3d 496 (7th Cir. 1999); see also Valero Energy Corp. v.
United States, 569 F.3d 626 (7th Cir. 2009).
147. 26 U.S.C. § 7525(a)(2)(A), (B) (2006). Written communication relating to certain as-
pects of tax shelters is not protected. 26 U.S.C. § 7525(b) (2006).
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